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THE PERSISTENCE OF EARNINGS AND
COPORATE GOVERNANCE IN IPO FIRMS
Mary F. Calegari
Maretno A. Harjoto

San Jose State University
San Jose State University

• In this study, we investigate the earnings persistence in !PO firms by examining the two components ofearnings: accruals
and cash flows. We also analyze the impact of corporate governance structure on earnings and the two earnings
components. In our comparison of the top and bottom quartiles based on the firms' earnings at the !PO year, we find that
although the top quartile firms have a significantly positive accrual component in the !PO year, they eventually have the
same negative accrual component ofearnings as the bottom quartile firms in the second year after the !PO. In contrast, we
find that the significant difference in the cash flow component between the top and bottom quartiles persists during the two
years after the !PO. This finding supports the existing literature that the cash flow component contributes to the persistence
of earnings while the accrual component does not. We also find that the corporate governance structure has a significant
impact on earnings and the components ofearnings for the top quartile firms, but not for the bottom quartile firms . This is
particularly evident since the top quartile firms have the opportunity to manage their earnings, while firms in the lowest
quartile are unable to manage their earnings.

Introduction
The notion of "earnings quality" - the degree to which
reported earnings reflects the true operational health of a
business - has long been of interest to both academics and
fin ancial practitioners. Prior research shows that firms with
persistent earnings are assigned a greater value in their
securities [Kormendi and Lipe 1987, Collins and Kothari
1989, Ali and Zarowin 1992].
Therefore, earnings
persistence should reflect a higher quality of earnings.
Th ese studies use statistically motivated models in
etermining their measure of earnings persistence. Sloan
(1 996), on the other hand, employs a model that relies on
e characteristics of the underlying accounting process.
He decomposes earnings into its accrual and cash flow
components and finds that current earnings is less likely to
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persist into the future if it is attributable primarily to the
accrual component of earnings as opposed to the cash flow
component.
Research in the area of earnings management find that
firms can manipulate reported earnings through the accrual
component. Firms can report earnings in excess of cash
flows by taking positive accruals. However, high earnings
due to large positive accruals will not persist into the future
and, therefore, lowering the quality of the firm's earnings
reporting process (Sloan 1996].
The initial public offering (IPO) process is particularly
susceptible to earnings management, offering entrepreneurs
both motivation and opportunities to manage earnings.
Managing earnings through accruals rather than making
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real efforts to maintain earnings persistence through cash
flows is considered an agency problem. An agency
problem occurs when management's actions and the
interest of the shareholders become misaligned. This
agency problem is exacerbated in IPO firms. When a firm
goes public, the number of non-manager shareholders
increases, therefore decreasing the manager's incentive to
maximize the firm's value. Prior research fmds that
corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate this agency
problem [Beasley 1996, Dechow et al. 1996, Yermack
1996, Core et al. 1999, Klein 2002, Reitenga and Tearney
2003].
Given this background, the purpose of this study is
twofold: First, we investigate the persistence of earnings in
IPO firms by examining the accrual and cash flow
components of earnings. Second, we analyze the impact of
corporate governance mechanisms (specifically, board
structure,
ownership
concentration,
and
CEO
characteristics) on earnings and the two earnings
components.

Literature Review
Accrual and Cash Flow Components of Earnings.
Financial statement analysis textbooks emphasize the
importance of analyzing the accrual and cash components
of current earnings in the assessment of future earnings
persistence. Cash flow from operations is less susceptible
to distortion than net income. The accrual-based net
income number relies on accruals, deferrals, allocations and
valuations, which all involve a higher degree of subjectivity
than what enters into the determination of cash flow from
operations [Bernstein 1993]. Although both components
contribute to current earnings, high performance that is
attributable to the cash flow component of earnings is more
likely to persist than high performance that is attributable to
the accrual component of earnings [Sloan 1996].
Earnings Management in IPO Firms. Practitioners
emphasize the role of accounting information in investment
and lending decisions by stockholders and creditors as a
major motivation for earnings manipulation. For example,
Kellogg and Kellogg ( 1991) state that the first two reasons
for fraud, misrepresentation, and manipulation in financial
statements are: (1) to encourage investors to buy an interest
in a company's stock as owners, or in bonds as creditors;
and (2) to increase the value of the stock of present
shareholders of the company. Similarly, the National
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (1993) states that
the first reason why financial statement manipulation is
committed is "to encourage investment through the sale of
stock." This evidence suggests that IPO firms have a strong
motivation to manipulate earnings.
Initial public offerings tend to be made by relatively
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small firms with limited operating histories. Generally, a
the time of the IPO, there is little publicly available
information about these firms other than that contained in
their prospectuses. Therefore, in evaluating an IPO firm's
future prosp~cts, investors must rely heavily on the firm's
disclosures made in the fmancial statements. This creates
an informational asymmetry between the entrepreneur
taking his firm public and potential investors. These
conditions provide IPO firms with the opportunity to
manipulate reported earnings.
Teoh et al. (1998) examines the relation between the
long-run post-IPO return underperformance and IPO firms '
earnings management. They find that IPO firms with
higher discretionary accruals have poorer stock return
performance in the subsequent three years. DuCharme et
al. (2001) investigates the role of earnings management by
issuers prior to making IPOs. Similar to earlier studies,
they fmd that abnormal accruals during the offer year are
significantly negatively related to subsequent firm stock
returns. These studies only examine the relation between
accruals and stock return performance. They do not
consider the cash flow component of earnings, the
subsequent performance of earnings, and the effect of
corporate governance on earnings management.
Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Internal coporate
governance processes are established to maintain the
credibility of firms' fmancial statements and safeguard
against such behavior as earnings management. The board
of directors is a crucial part of the corporate structure. The
board provides the link between the providers of capital
(shareholders) and those who use that capital to create value
(managers). Fama (1980) theorizes that outside directors
are essential to creating a board that will function as an
effective monitor of management. Empirical evidence
indicates that more independent board structures contribute
to better monitoring of management and lead to better
decision-making that follows shareholders' interests
[Hochberg 2003, Reitenaga and Tearney 2003]. The major
committees involved in the governance of the firm are the
audit and compensation committees. The role of the audit
committee includes preventing fraudulent accounting
statements, as well as mediating disputes between
management and outside auditors regarding the application
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
The
compensation committee determines and reviews
compensation packages for top management [Hochberg
2003].
The ownership structure of the firm may also influence
top management's financial reporting decisions. Since
external blockholders have large shareholdings, they could
become effective monitors, reducing the likelihood of
earnings management [Reitenga and Tearney 2003].
Warfield et al. (1995) find that managerial ownership is
positively related to the informativeness of accounting
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earnings. They also find that the magnitude of discretionary
accounting accrual adjustments is significantly higher when
managerial ownership is low. This evidence suggests that
managerial ownership mitigates earnings manipulation
through accruals and increases earnings quality.
Various CEO characteristics provide CEOs with the
incentive and opportunity to manage earnings to their
advantage. CEO tenure and whether the CEO is the founder
of the company measures the relative power of the CEO.
When the chairman of the board is the CEO, management is
accountable to a body Jed by management. The CEO is then
put in the position of evaluating his or her own
performance, creating a clear conflict of interest.

Contribution of the Study
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three
ways. First, our paper extends the current research by
examining total earnings and both the accrual and cash flow
components of earnings for IPO firms. By decomposing
earnings into its accrual and cash flow components, we can
ascertain which component is more susceptible to earnings
management and influenced by corporate governance
mechanisms. This differs from prior studies on earnings
management in IPO firms since they focus only on the
accrual component of earnings and its relation to
subsequent stock return performance [Teoh et al. 1998,
DuCharme et al. 200 1]. Second, we investigate the firms in
the top and bottom quartile of earnings in the IPO year, and
observe the persistence of earnings and its components in
the first and second year following the IPO. The top
quartile represents firms with high (strong) performance
and the bottom quartile represents firms with poor (weak)
performance. By separately analyzing these two sub
samples, we can determine whether earnings and its
components behave differently based on performance
categories. Lastly, we focus our analysis on the significance
of corporate governance on earnings, and the accrual and
cash flow components of earnings, for the top and bottom
quartiles of IPO firms . This enables us to detect whether
there are any differences in the roles that corporate
governance plays in these two groups of firms .

Methodology
Sample, Data, and Variables. The total number of IPOs
reached its peak in 1996 and 1997. To maximize the size of
our sample, we utilize the sample of firms that went public
during the peak period of IPOs (1996-1997). Since we are
interested in the evolution of earnings after the IPO, we
require that these firms survive at least two consecutive
years after its IPO year. 1
The sample of IPO firms and information on the primary
seasoned equity offering following the IPO are gathered
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from the Security bata Corporation (SDC) Global Issues
database. Financial information about the firm is collected
from the Compustat and the IPO prospectuses.
The
corporate governance data such as CEO and external
blockholder ownership concentration, the board size and
composition are·· manually collected from the Security
Exchange Commissions (SEC) Edgar online. Additional
information about the firm's age and the founder of the firm
are obtained from proxy statements from the SEC Edgar
online.
The fmancial variables of interest in this study are
earnings, accruals and cash from operations. Earnings is
defined as operating income after depreciation . We select
this definition because it excludes non-recurring items. The
accrual component of earnings is computed using
information from the balance sheet and income statement,
which is common in the earnings management literature
[Dechow et al. 1995, Sloan 1996].
Accruals= (L'iCA- L'iCash)- (L'iCL - L'iSTD- L'iTP)- Dep
where, L'iCA = change in current assets, L'1Cash = change in
cash/equivalents, L'iCL = change in current liabilities, L'iSTD
= change in debt included in current liabilities, L'iTP =
change in income taxes payable, and Dep = depreciation
and amortization expense. Debt in current liabilities is
excluded from accruals because it relates to financing
transactions as opposed to operating transactions. Income
taxes payable is also excluded from accruals for consistency
with the definition of earnings employed in the empirical
tests. The cash flow component of earnings is computed as
the difference between earnings and the accrual component
of earnings. This methodology is similar to that used by
Sloan ( 1996).
The empirical tests require cross-sectional and temporal
comparisons of the magnitude of earnings performance and
the relative magnitude of the accrual and cash flow
components of earnings. Therefore, we standardize all
three financial variables by firm size to facilitate the
comparisons. We use total assets as our proxy for firm size,
measured as the average of the beginning and end of year
book value of total assets. The three financial variables we
use in the empirical tests are defined as follows :
Earnings

Income from Continuing Operations
Average Total Assets

Accrual
Component

Accruals
Average Total Assets

Cash Flow
Component

Income from Continuing Operations 
Accruals
Average Total Assets

The corporate governance variables we use in this study
are as follows : (1) for board structure we use board size
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(BODSIZE),
percentage
of
outside
directors
(ODPCTBOD), size of audit committee (AUDCOM), and
size of compensation committee (COMPCOM); (2) for
ownership concentration we use percentage of external
blockholder ownership (EXTBLOCK) and percentage of
total CEO ownership, including restricted stock grants
(TOTCEOWN); and (3) for CEO characteristics we use a
dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is the chairman
of the board and zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR), a dummy
variable that equals one if the CEO is the founder of the
firm and zero otherwise (CEOFOUND), and CEO tenure
(CEOTENUR).
Additionally, we control for the age of the company
(YRFOUND), firm size (measured by the natural log of
total assets) (LOGASSET) 2 , and whether the firm conducts
a primary seasoned equity offering (SEO). Older firms tend
to be more established and exhibit stronger and more stable
earnings performance.
Larger firms benefit from
economies of scale and thus become more efficient and
profitable. SEO is an indicator variable taking the value of
one if the firm conducts a seasoned equity offering since
firms may manage earnings upwards prior to an SEO.
We also include a time trend variable (TREND) in our
analysis. Since we are interested in investigating the
behavior of earnings, and its accrual and cash flow
components, over the two years subsequent to the IPO, this
time trend variable captures any changes over time in
earnings and its components.
Lastly, to control for any industry effects, we include
dummy variables that equal one if the firm belongs to one
of the two-digit SIC codes 10 through 87 and zero
otherwise (SIC 10-87).
Regression Equations.
We investigate the relation
between earnings, and its accrual and cash flow
components, and corporate governance mechanisms
through multiple regression analysis. We separately regress
earnings (Equation 1), the accrual component (Equation 2),
and the cash flow component (Equation 3) on the corporate
governance and other control variables. The models are
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with White's
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
+ fl 1BODSIZE;, +
+ fl 4COMPCOM;, +
fl6TOTCEOWNit + fl,CEOCHAIRit +
fl 9 CEOTENURit + fl 10 YRFOUND;, +
fl12SEO;, + flJJTREND + flu-4~1CI0-87

Earningsit

=

flo

fl~UDCOMit

fl 20DPCTBODit +
fl 5EXTBLOCK1r +
fl~~CEOFOUNDit

+

fl 11 LOGASSETit +
+ eit
(1)

Accrua!Componentit =flo+ fl 1BODSIZE;, + fl 20DPCTBOD;,
+ fl 3AUDCOM;, + fl 4COMPCOM;, + fl 5EXTBLOCK1r +
fl6TOTCEOWNit + flcCEOCHAJR;, + fl11CEOFOUNDit +
fl 9 CEOTENURit + flJOYRFOUNDit + fl 11 LOGASSETit +
fl12SEOit + fl 13 TREND + flu-4~ICJ0-87 + eit
(2)
CashF!owComponent; 1
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flo

+

+

fl 20DPCTBODit + fl~UDCOMit + fl 4COMPCOM;, +
fl 5EXTBLOCK1r + fl 6TOTCEOWN;, + fl~EOCHAIR;, +
fl8CEOFOUNDu + fl 9CEOTENURu + fl 10 YRFOUND;, +
fl 11 LOGASSETu + fl 12SE0u + fl 13 TREND + flu- 46SICJ0-87

+ e;,

(3)

Descriptive Statistics. Table 1 presents the descriptive
statistics of the overall sample and the firms in the top and
bottom quartiles of earnings at the time of the IPO. The top
quartile subsample is formed by choosing the firms that are
in the top quartile of earnings at their IPO year. The bottom
quartile subsample is formed by choosing the firms that are
in the bottom quartile of earnings at their IPO year.
There are no significant differences in the average board
size, board structure, and size of the audit and
compensation committees between the top and bottom
quartiles. However, we observe a significant difference in
the average external blockholders and CEO ownership
between the top and bottom quartile firms. The firms in the
top quartile tend to have a lower external blockholding and
a higher CEO ownership compared to the bottom quartile.
This evidence indicates that there are more differences in
the ownership structure rather than the board structure
between the top and bottom quartile firms.
We also find that the CEOs in the top quartile firms are
more likely to be appointed as chairman of the board and
have longer tenure than the CEOs in the bottom quartile
firms. The top quartile firms are also older and larger in
asset size compared to the bottom quartile firms. This
implies that firms in the top quartile are likely to be more
established than the bottom quartile firms.
Comparison of Top and Bottom Quartiles Ranked on
Earnings in IPO Year. Table 2 reports the evolution of
the · firms' earnings and its accrual and cash flow
components in the IPO year, one year after the IPO, and
two years after the IPO, for the full sample and the top and
bottom quartile firms. Table 2 also presents the univariate
test of means and medians (t-stat and Wilcoxon z-score)
between the top and bottom quartiles based on earnings, the
accrual component, and cash flow component. Earnings for
the full sample decline during the two years subsequent to
the IPO. Earnings for the top quartile firms are positive and
significantly different from earnings for the bottom quartile
firms in the IPO year. This difference persists after the IPO
even though earnings for the top quartile firms decline
during the two subsequent years.
Similar to earnings, the accrual component for the full
sample declines during the two years following the IPO.
The accrual component for the top quartile is positive and
significantly different from the bottom quartile. However,
the accrual component for the top firms deteriorates and
becomes negative and insignificantly different from the
bottom firms in the second year after the IPO. This
indicates that the top quartile firms with strong earnings due
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Bottom Quartile

Full Sample

Top Quartile

Variables

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

EARNINGS

-0.066

0.054

-0.418

-0.375

0.152

0.15

ACRRUAL
CASH FLOW
BODSIZE
ODPCTBOD
AUDCOM
COMPCOM
EXTBLOCK
TOTCEOWN
CEOCHAIR
CEO FOUND
CEOTENUR
YRFOUND
LOG ASSET
SEQ
Total firms
Observations

-0.01
-0.056
6.682
72.146
2 .595
2.654
22 .983
13.253
0.495
0.396
4.9
9.196
4.305
0.112
Ill
321

-0.024
0.022
6
75
3
3
20.1
6.02
0
0
4
7
4.063
0

-0.043
-0.375
6.642
75.711
2.559
2.524
27 .539
10.546
0.381
0.452
4.464
6.892
3.726
0.095
28
84

-0.031
-0.366
6.5
80
3
2
30.25
5.416
0
0
4
6
3.55
0

0.044
0.108
6.726
70.065
2.655
2.655
16.684
20.274
0.583
0.464
6.988
13.19
4.615
0.166
28
84

0.02
0.124
7
71.43
3
3
12.15
12.701
0
0
5
13
4 .591
0

TABLE2
COMPARISON OF TOP AND BOTTOM QUARTILES
RANKED ON EARNINGS IN IPO YEAR
Panel A. Earnings

IPO year
First year
Second year
Panel

~.

Full Sample
Mean
Median

Bottom Quartile
Median
Mean

Top Quartile
Median
Mean

-0 .02
-0.056
-0.081

-0.421
-0.411
-0.423

0.223
0.146
0.088

0.065
0.038
0.021

-0.391
-0.323
-0.38

0.184
0.14
0.121

t-stat

Wilcoxon
z-score

-11.89***
-7 .05***
-5.50***

-6.42***
-5 .86***
-5 .01 ***

Accrual Component
Full Sample

IPO year
First year
Second year

Bottom Quartile

Wilcoxon

Top Quartile

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

t-stat

z-score

0.003
-0 .009
-0.023

-0.019
-0.013
-0.032

-0.035
-0.082
-0.011

-0.03
-0.037
-0.021

0.072
0.074
-0 .013

0.024
0.043
-0.032

-2 .76***
-3 .81 ***
0.15

-2.32**
-3. 59***
0.28

t-stat

Wilcoxon
z-score

-8.41***
-5.35***
-5.47***

-5 .85***
-5.03* **
-5.09***

Panel C. Cash Flow Component

lPO year
First year
Second year

** p<0.05
FALL2005

Full Sample
Mean
Median

Bottom Quartile
Mean
Median

Top Quartile
Mean
Median

-0 .035
-0 .059
-0 .071

-0.386
-0 .328
-0.411

0. 151
0.071
0.102

0.043
0.01 3
0.018

-0.396
-0.353
-0.372

0.151
0.074
0.13

***p<O.OI
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TABLE3
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR FULL SAMPLE
Equation 1
Earnings
Variables
BOD SIZE
ODPCTBOD
AUDCOM
COMPCOM
EXTBLOCK
TOTCEOWN
CEOCHAIR
CEO FOUND
CEOTENUR
YRFOUND
LOGASSET
SEO
TREND
INTERCEPT
R-square
Total firms
Observations

Equation 2
Accrual Component

Equation 3
Cash Flow Component

Coef.

t-stat

Coef.

t-stat

Coef.

t-stat

0.0021
-0.0035
-0.1065
0.0619
0.0008
0.0027
-0 .0346
-0 .1307
0.0150
0.0088
0.0546
0.0792
-0 .0551
-0 .2506
0.50
Ill
321

0.23
-2.54**
-2.00**
2.08**
0.93
2.25**
-0.96
-3.61 ***
3.71 ***
3.98***
3.19***
2.15**
-3.02***
-1.56

-0 .0013
-0.0017
-0 .0100
-0.0176
0.0003
0.0009
-0.0334
-0 .0229
0.0048
0.0002
-0.0102
0.0727
-0 .0121
0.1272
0.32
111
321

-0.28
-2.55**
-0.59
-1.25
0.84
1.66
-1.94*
-1.30
2.59***
0.21
-1.58
3.54***
-1.51

0.0034
-0.0018
-0.0965
0.0795
0.0005
0.0019
-0.0012
-0.1077
0.0102
0.0085
0.0649
0.0064
-0.0430
-0 .3778
0.47
Ill
321

0.37
-1.33
-1.86*
2.65***
0.59
1.47
-0.03
-2.96***
2.51**
3.57***
3.74***
0.18
-2.33**
-2.06**

1.21

The estimated slope coefficients for the industry dummies (2-digit SIC) are not reported.
**p<0.05
***p<O.Ol
* p < 0.1
to a higher accrual component at the IPO eventually have
the same accruals as the firms with weak earnings in the
second year after the IPO. This evidence implies that
strong earnings at the IPO that are attributable to high
accruals will not persist during the two years after the IPO.
The cash flow component for the full sample has a slight
downward trend , but not as much as earnings and accruals .
The cash flow component for the top quartile is positive and
significantly different from the bottom quartile. This
difference persists during the two years after the IPO.
When we examine the earnings and its components for the
second year, we find that the top firms have a positive cash
flow component but a negative accrual component
indicating that the positive earnings at the second year is
primarily attributable to the cash flow component of
earnings. This implies that the cash flow component
persists after the IPO. The overall findings indicate that the
cash flow component tends to persist, while the accrual
component does not persist during the two years after the
IPO.

Multiple Regression Results
Multiple Regression Results for Full Sample. Table 3
presents the multiple regression results for the full sample.
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We find that the percentage of outside directors
(ODPCTBOD) is negatively related to total earnings (t=
2.54, p<0.05) and the accrual component (t=-2.55, p<0.05) .
IPO firms with a larger percentage of outside directors tend
to have a lower accrual component and, therefore, result in
lower total earnings. This signifies the importance of the
outside directors' role in monitoring management from
conducting earnings manipulation through accruals and
maintaining the quality of earnings.
We find that the number of audit committee members
(AUDCOM) has a significant negative association with
earnings (t=-2.00, p<0.05) and the cash flow component
(t=-1.86, p<O.l ). This finding indicates that IPO firms with
a higher number of audit committee members in their board
tend to adopt more conservative cash flow reporting and ,
therefore , earnings reporting. On the other hand, the
of
compensation
committee
members
number
(COMPCOM) in the board has a significant positive
relation with earnings (t=2.08, p<0.05) and cash flows
(t=2 .65, p<0.01) . This evidence suggests that the audit
committee has a different (opposite) role compared to the
compensation committee in influencing management's
reporting of earnings .
In terms of ownership structure (EXTBLOCK AND
TOTCEOWN), we only find a positive association between
CEO ownership (TOTCEOWN) and total earnings (t=2 .25,
JOURNAL OF GLOBAL BUSINESS

TABLE4
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TOP QUARTILE SAMPLE
Equation 2
Accrual Component

Equation 1
Earnings
Variables
BODSIZE
ODPCTBOD
AUDCOM
COMPCOM
EXTBLOCK
TOTCEOWN
CEOCHAIR
CEO FOUND
CEOTENUR
YRFOUND
LOGASSET
SEO
TREND
INTERCEPT
R-square
Total firms
Observations

Equation 3
Cash Flow Component

Coef.

t-stat

Coef.

t-stat

Coef.

t-stat

0.0208
-0.0036
-0 .071I
0.1040
O.OOOI
-0.0001
-0.0368
O.OI27
0.0077
0.0034
O.OI16
0.0588
-0.0797
-0.0646
0.56
28
84

1.04
-2.76***
-2.02**
3.65***
0.07
-0.05
-0.83
0.18
1.53
0.93
0.49
1.49
-3.7I ***
-0.28

0.0078
-0.0080
0.0793
-0.0513
-0 .0038
-0.0030
-0.0264
O.I004
-0 .0019
-0.002I
-0.0537
0.1I20
-O.OI80
0.7870
0.66
28
84

0.44
-5.70***
1.71 *
-1.88*
-2.34**
-1.68*
-0.64
1.50
-0.55
-0.93
-1.89*
3.75***
-1.03
3.35***

0.0130
0.0044
-0 .1504
0.1553
0.0039
0.0029
-O.OI04
-0 .0877
0.0095
0.0055
0.0653
-0.0532
-0.0616
-0 .85I7
0.52
28
84

0.53
2 .69***
-3.04***
4.70***
1.95*
1.17
-0 .22
-0 .93
1.71 *
1.25
1.84*
-1.08
-2.64***
-3 .22***

The estimated slope coefficients for the industry dummies (2-digit SIC) are not reported.
* p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p <0.01
p<0.05) . This finding implies that the ownership structure
of an IPO does not seem to influence the level of the
accrual or cash flow components of earnings.
as
the
chairman of the board
The
CEO
(CEOCHAIR)does not seem to influence the firm's
earnings and cash flow component, and it only marginally
affects the accrual component (t=-1.94, p<O. I ). However,
the fact that the CEO is the founder of the company
(CEOFOUND) has a negative and significant effect on the
firm's earnings (t=-3 .6I, p<O.OI) and cash flow component
(t=-2.96, p<0.01), but not the accrual component. This
latter finding indicates that if the founder is the CEO of the
firm, the firm tends to earn less than firms with a non
We also find that CEO tenure
founder CEO .
(CEOTENUR) has a positive impact on earnings (t=3.71 ,
p<O.OI) and both the accrual and cash flow components
(t=2.59 and t=2.5I, respectively). This suggests that CEO
tenure represents the CEO human capital and experience
that is important to boost earnings in the newly public
firms.
After controlling for other factors, we find that older
(YRFOUND) and larger (LOGASSET) firms tend to have
higher earnings (t=3.98 and t=3 . I9, respectively) since it
has a higher cash flow component (t=3.57 and t=3.74,
respectively) . IPO firms that conduct a primary seasoned
equity offering (SEO) after the IPO tend to have a larger
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accrual component (t=3 .54, p<O.OI) and, therefore, higher
earnings (t=2 .15, p<0.05). We observe that the firms '
earnings have declined over the period following the IPO
(as indicated by the time TREND variable). One additional
year after the IPO reduces the firm's earnings and cash flow
component by 5.5 cents and 4.3 cents, respectively. We do
not find the same decaying trend of the firms' accrual
component in the full sample .3

Multiple Regression Results for Top Quartile Sample.
The results presented in Tables I and 2 indicate that there
are significant differences in earnings, accruals, cash flows,
and corporate governance mechanisms between firms in the
top and bottom quartiles of earnings. To further investigate
these differences, we separately perform our regression
analysis on the top and bottom quartile subsamples .
Table 4 reports the regression results for the top quartile
subsample. We find that the percentage of outside directors
(ODPCTBOD) is negatively related to earnings and the
accrual component (t=-2.76 and t=-5.7, respectively), but
positively related to the cash flow component (t=2.69,
p<O.OI). This evidence suggests that more independent
boards inhibit management from manipulating earnings
through accruals and from over-investing surplus cash .
Similar to the results for the full sample (Table 3), we find
that the number of audit committee members (AUDCOM)
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TABLES
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR BOTTOM QUARTILE SAMPLE
Equation 2
Accrual 9omponent

Equation 1
Earnings
Variables
BODSIZE
ODPCTBOD
AUDCOM
COMPCOM
EXTBLOCK
TOTCEOWN
CEO CHAIR
CEO FOUND
CEOTENUR
YRFOUND
LOGASSET
SEO
TREND
INTERCEPT
R-square
Total firms
Observations

Equation 3
Cash Flow Component

Coef.

t-stat

Coef.

t-stat

Coef.

t-stat

0.0063
0.0062
-0.0395
-0.1227
0.0056
0.0103
0.0240
-0 .1141
-0 .0619
0.0565
0.0839
0.1385
-0 .0109
-0.5406
0.67
28
84

0.31
2.03**
-0.36
-1.75*
2.33**
2.33**
0.39
-1.07
-1.99**
2.99***
2.09**
1.72*
-0.33
-1 .26

-0.0009
0.0006
0.0167
-0.0025
0.0015
0.0013
0.0207
-0.0267
-0 .0025
0.0076
-0.0086
0.0153
0.0098
-0.2184
0.30
28
84

-0.09
0.33
0.22
-0.04
1.03
0.86
0.55
-0.60
-0.22
0.70
-0.40
0.34
0.51
-0.70

0.0073
0.0056
-0 .0562
-0.1203
0.0041
0.0091
0.0033
-0.0874
-0.0594
0.0489
0.0925
0.1232
-0.0207
-0.3222
0.64
28
84

0.35
1.85*
-0.55
-1.58
1.56
1.93*
0.05
-0.81
-1.97**
2.48**
2.37**
1.33
-0 .56
-0.83

The estimated slope coefficients for the industry dummies (2-digit SIC) are not reported.
**p < 0.05
***p<0.01
* p < 0.1
has a negative association with earnings and the cash flow
component (t=-2.02 and t=-3 .04, respectively) . Its positive
impact on the accrual component is only marginally
significant at the 10 percent level (t= 1.71 ). The number of
compensation committee members (COMPCOM), like the
full sample, has an opposing effect on earnings, accruals,
and cash flows .
We find that the external blockholders' ownership
(EXTBLOCK) is negatively related to the accrual
component (t=-2.34, p<0 .05), but only marginally
positively associated w~th the cash flow component (t= 1.95,
p<0. 1). We find that CEO ownership (TOTCEOWN) is
marginally related with the accrual component of earnings
(t=-1.68, p<O.l). This implies that a higher ownership
concentration in the hands of external blockholders
increases earnings through the cash flow component and it
reduces the potential for earnings management through
accruals.
This finding is consistent with the extant
literature that external blockholders have a strong incentive
to monitor the manager's efforts to increase the firm ' s
earnings through real activities that boost the firm's cash
flow rather than manipulating earnings through accruals.
We find that CEO characteristics (CEOCHAIR,
CEOFOUND, AND CEOTENUR) do not significantly
affect earnings and the components of earnings in the top
quartile subsample. IPO firms that conduct seasoned equity
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offerings (SEO) are likely to increase the accrual
component (t=3.75, p<0.01), but not the cash component or
total earnings. We observe that over time (TREND
variable) the earnings of the top quartile firms decrease
since their cash flow component of earnings decreases after
the IPO (t=-3.71 and t=-2 .64, respecitively) . This finding is
consistent with Loughran and Ritter (1997) who find a
long-run decrease in operating performance of IPO firms.
Multiple Regression Results for Bottom Quartile
Sample. Table 5 reports the regression results for the
bottom quartile subsample. We find that the proportion of
outside directors (ODPCTBOD) is positively related to
earnings (=2.03, p<0.05) and the cash flow component
(t=l.85, p<0.1), but these results are weaker compared to
the top quartile subsample . In contrast to the top quartile,
we find that outside directors have no effect on the accrual
component for the bottom quartile (t=0.33). We also find
that both the audit (AUDCOM) and compensation
(COMPCOM) committees do not have a significant effect
on earnings and the components of earnings. We find that
the poor performance of the firms in the bottom quartile
persists during the period after the IPO and do not have the
opportunity to manage their earnings through accruals.
Therefore, outside directors and the audit and compensation
committees do not have as important a role in monitoring
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management's actions in the bottom quartile firms as in the
top quartile firms.
We fmd that external blockholding (EXTBLOCK) is
positively related with earnings . (t=2.33, p<0.05), but not
the components of earnings. In addition, CEO ownership
(TOTCEOWN) is positively associated with earnings
(t=2.33, p<0.05) and the cash flow component (t=l.93,
p<O.l).
Interestingly, we find that CEO tenure
(CEOTENUR) has a negative association with earnings and
cash flows (t=-1.99, and t=-1.97, respectively). We also
fmd that older and larger firms tend to have higher earnings
(t=2,99 and t=2.09, respectively) through the cash flow
component (t=2.48 and t=2.37, respectively). The earnings
and components of earnings for the bottom quartile firms
do not change over the two years after the IPO (TREND
variable).
Overall, we find that board structure, ownership
structure, and CEO characteristics have less influence on
earnings and the components of earnings for the bottom
firms. This is probably due to the bottom quartile firms
having persistently negative earnings and, therefore, do not
have the ability to manipulate earnings through accruals or
cash flows . We find that the bottom quartile firms are
influenced primarily by their age and size.

Conclusion
In this study, we investigate earnings persistence in IPO
firms by examining the accrual and cash flow components
of earnings. We also analyze the impact of corporate
governance mechanisms on earnings and the · two
components of earnings. We analyze the full sample and
two subsamples of the firms that are in the highest and
lowest quartiles of earnings.
We fmd that the strong positive earnings reported by the
top quartile firms in the IPO year do not persist during the
two subsequent years. This decline is due to the
deterioration of the accrual component of earnings from
positive in the IPO year to negative in the second year after
the IPO. In contrast, the negative earnings reported by the
bottom quartile firms remain fairly consistent from the IPO
year through the second year following the lPO.
We find that the percentage of outside directors is
negatively related to earnings and the accrual component
for the full sample and top quartile firms . In addition, a
positive relation is found for the cash flow component for
the top quartile. This suggests that more independent boards
inhibit the manipulation of earnings through accruals and
the over-investment of surplus cash for firms with strong
positive earnings. Contrary to this, a positive association is
found between earnings and the percentage of outside
directors for firms in the bottom quartile. This latter finding
suggests that the role of outside directors is different for
firms with weak (negative) earnings.
Interestingly, we find that the audit and compensation
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committees have differing (opposing) roles in relation to the
firm's earnings and its components. We fmd a negative
relation between the number of audit committee members
and earnings and the cash flow component. This suggests
that an increase in audit committee members may cause
managers to become more conservative in accounting
reporting of real profits through cash flows. In contrast, we
find a positive association between the number of
compensation committee members and earnings and the
cash flow component.
The compensation committee
rewards managers for earning real profits (pay-for
performance), thus resulting in higher earnings from the
cash flow component. These results are found for the full
sample and top quartile firms, but not for the bottom
quartile firms.
We find that external blockholders' ownership is
negatively related to the accrual component of earnings but
has no relation to total earnings for the top firms. However,
for the bottom firms, external blockholders' ownership
positively affects total earnings, but not the components of
earnings. Similarly, CEO ownership has no relation to
earnings or its components for the top quartile firms, but
has a positive association to earnings for the bottom quartile
firms. This is probably due to the differing ownership
structures between the top and bottom firms.
We find that CEO characteristics have no relation to
earnings and its components for firms in the top quartile,
and only CEO tenure is negatively related to earnings and
cash flows for the bottom quartile. We also find that firm
age and size is positively associated with earnings and cash
flows for the bottom firms, but not the top firms.
Lastly, we find IPO firms that conduct a SEO tend to
have a larger accrual component of earnings. This finding
renders further investigation on whether firms that decide to
raise capital through equity issues do in fact manipulate
their earnings during the issuance period . Future research
can investigate the potential for earnings management
through the accrual component when firms decide to come
back to the capital market by issuing new equity.

Endnotes
1

The two years after the IPO peak period (1998-1999) are
just prior to the stock market crash of March 2000. We
limit our sample to this period so as not to contaminate our
findings with the impact of the stock market downturn in
the United States in the years following our sample period.
2
We replace the natural log of total assets with the natural
log of total sales in the regression equations to test whether
our results are caused by spurious correlations between the
dependent variables (that have assets as the denominator)
and the log of assets as an independent variable. We find
that our reported results remain robust with the log of total
sales as a measure ofthe firm's economies of scale.
3
We do not report the slope coefficients for the two-digit
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industry dummies. We fmd that several industries have
significantly higher earnings due to a higher accrual
component (i.e., metal mining, electrical and transportation
equipment, wholesale trade, and home furnishing). Other
industries such as apparel stores, amusement service, social
service and engineering and management service, have
higher earnings due to a higher cash flow component.
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